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Abstract.
The paradox of cooperation among selfish individuals still puzzles scientific
communities. Although a large amount of evidence has demonstrated that cooperator
clusters in spatial games are effective to protect cooperators against the invasion of
defectors, we continue to lack the condition for the formation of a giant cooperator
cluster that assures the prevalence of cooperation in a system. Here, we study the
dynamical organization of cooperator clusters in spatial prisoner’s dilemma game to
offer the condition for the dominance of cooperation, finding that a phase transition
characterized by the emergence of a large spanning cooperator cluster occurs when
the initial fraction of cooperators exceeds a certain threshold. Interestingly, the phase
transition belongs to different universality classes of percolation determined by the
temptation to defect b. Specifically, on square lattices, 1 < b < 4/3 leads to a phase
transition pertaining to the class of regular site percolation, whereas 3/2 < b < 2 gives
rise to a phase transition subject to invasion percolation with trapping. Our findings
offer deeper understanding of the cooperative behaviors in nature and society.
PACS numbers: 02.50.Le, 89.75.Hc, 64.60.ah
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1. Introduction
Cooperation is ubiquitous in biological and social systems [1]. Understanding
the emergence and persistence of cooperation among selfish individuals remains an
outstanding problem. The development of evolutionary game theory has offered a
powerful mathematical framework to address this problem [2]. In order to capture
the interaction pattern among greedy individuals, various models have been introduced,
among which the prisoner’s dilemma game (PDG) has been a prevailing paradigm [3].
In the original PDG, two players simultaneously decide whether to cooperate or
defect. They both receive the payoff R upon mutual cooperation and the payoff P
upon mutual defection. If one cooperates but the other defects, the defector gets the
payoff T , while the cooperator gains the payoff S. The payoff rank for the PDG
is T > R > P > S. As a result, in a single round of PDG, mutual defection
is the best strategy for both players, rendering the social dilemma, in other words,
the Nash equilibrium. For simplicity but without loss of generality, the elements of
the payoff matrix for the PDG are often rescaled with T = b > 1, R = 1, and
P = S = 0 [4], where b denotes the temptation to defect. Since the pioneering work of
Nowak and May [4], evolutionary games have been extensively studied in structured
population, including regular lattices [5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16] and complex
networks [17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36].
To facilitate cooperation in spatial PDG, a number of mechanisms have been proposed,
such as voluntary participation [37], punishment [38], similarity [39], inhomogeneous
activity [40], social diversity [41, 42], dynamical linking [43], asymmetric interaction
and replacement graph [44], migration [45, 46, 47, 48], in-group favoritism [49],
interdependent links [50, 51], and so on.
It has been known that the formation of cooperator clusters plays an important
role in promoting cooperation in spatial games [52]. A cooperator cluster is defined as
a connected component (subgraph) fully occupied by cooperators. Within clusters,
cooperators can assist each other and the benefits of mutual cooperation outweigh
the losses against defector. It is of paramount importance to explore the dynamical
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organization of cooperator clusters so as to understand the emergence of cooperation
among selfish individuals. Previous studies focused on the size distribution of cooperator
clusters [53, 54], but pay little attention to the conditions under which a giant cooperator
cluster of the order of the system size arises. In this paper, we attempt to address
this issue from the perspective of the percolation theory [55, 56]. In recent years, the
percolation transition characterized by a large spanning cluster arising at the critical
point, has been widely found in various dynamical processes, such as the spreading
of disease [57], the formation of public opinion [58] and cascading failures [59]. In
particular, percolation phenomena with respect to optimal cooperation level in diluted
system were discovered in Ref. [60, 61]. However, percolation phenomena pertaining
to the emergence of cooperator clusters have not yet been studied in the framework of
evolutionary games. Here, we report a percolation transition behavior characterized
by the emergence of a large spanning cooperator cluster when the initial fraction
of cooperators in the system exceeds a certain threshold. The phase transition can
be classified to either regular site percolation or invasion percolation with trapping,
depending on the temptation to defect. We substantiate our findings by systematic
numerical simulations and analysis of phase transition.
The paper is organized as follows. In Sec. 2, we formalize the problem by
introducing the PDG on square lattices. In Sec. 3, we study the cooperation percolation
in terms of different values of the temptation to defect. Finally, conclusions and
discussions are presented in Sec. 4.
2. Model and Methods
Individuals are located on a L × L square lattice with periodic boundary conditions.
Each individual x can follow one of two strategies: cooperation or defection , described
by
β =
1
2
+ α2 (1)
respectively. At each time step, each individual plays the PDG with its four nearest
neighbors. The accumulated payoff of individual x can be expressed as
Px =
∑
y∈Ωx
zTxMzy , (2)
where the sum runs over the nearest neighbor set Ωx of node x and M is the rescaled
payoff matrix with
M =
(
1 0
b 0
)
. (3)
According to the setting in Ref. [62], initially cooperation and defection strategies
are randomly assigned to all individuals in terms of some probabilities: with probability
f a node is occupied by a cooperator and with probability 1− f a node is occupied by
a defector. Individuals asynchronously update their strategies in a random sequential
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order [63, 64, 65, 66]. A randomly selected player compares its payoff with its nearest
neighbors and changes strategy by following the one (including itself) with the highest
payoff. After a period of transient time, the system will enter a steady state.
We focus on the formation of cooperator clusters in the steady state. In order
to study the critical behavior regarding to the giant cooperator cluster, we employ the
normalized size of the largest cooperator cluster s1, the susceptibility χ and the Binder’s
fourth-order cumulant U . These quantities are defined as follows [68]:
s1 =
S1
N
, (4)
χ = N [〈s2
1
〉 − 〈s1〉
2], (5)
U = 1−
〈s4
1
〉
3〈s21〉
2
, (6)
where S1 the size of the largest cooperator cluster, N = L × L is the system size and
〈· · ·〉 stands for configurational averages. According to the standard finite-size scaling
approach [68], the phase transition point can be identified by the Binder’s fourth-order
cumulant U and there are the following power-law relationships at the critical value:
s1 ∼ N
−β/ν and χ ∼ Nγ/ν . (7)
We can use the tool to identify phase transitions pertaining to the formation of
cooperator clusters and explore the class to which the phase transition belongs.
3. Main results
According to our analysis of phase transition, we can separate the values of b into four
regions: b ∈ (1, 4/3), (4/3, 3/2), (3/2, 2) and (2,∞). We find that in the same region, the
cooperator clusters with respect to percolation transition keep unchanged, irrespective
of the value of b. In the following, we present the results in the four regions respectively.
3.1. The case of 1 < b < 4/3
We first explore the characteristics of cooperator clusters when 1 < b < 4/3. Figure 1
shows the snapshots of the spatial distributions of cooperators and defectors on a
200× 200 square lattice. We can observe that the size of the largest cooperator cluster
(denoted by red) expands as the initial fraction of cooperators f increases. In contrast,
the size of the second largest cooperator cluster (denoted by blue) becomes larger firstly
but then shrinks as f continuously increases. The non-monotonic relationship between
the size of the second largest cooperator cluster and f implies the existence of a second-
order phase transition [67].
Figure 2 shows the normalized size of the largest cooperator cluster s1 and the
fraction Fc of cooperators in the population, as a function of f . We see that both Fc
and s1 increase toward 1 as f increases. Over a wide range of f , Fc is larger than
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Figure 1. Snapshots of distributions of cooperators and defectors on a 200 × 200
square lattice. The temptation to defect 1 < b < 4/3. The red denotes the largest
cooperator cluster, the blue denotes the second largest cooperator cluster, the gray
denotes the other cooperator clusters and the black denotes defectors. The initial
fraction of cooperators is (a) f = 0.6, (b) f = 0.72 and (c) f = 0.76, respectively.
0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
F c
  ,
  s
1
f
 F
c
 s1
Figure 2. The normalized size of the largest cooperator cluster s1 and the fraction
of cooperators in the whole population Fc, as a function of the initial fraction of
cooperators f on a 1600× 1600 square lattice. The temptation to defect 1 < b < 4/3.
Each curve is an average of 1000 different realizations.
s1, where as for very small and large values of f , Fc is approximately equal to s1. In
Fig. 2, we can also find that there exists a critical value fc, below which s1 approaches
0, while above which s1 continuously increases as f increases. The fact that Fc > 0.5
at fc suggests that it is possible for cooperators to form a giant cluster comparative to
the size of the system, insofar as sufficient number of cooperators survive during the
evolution.
Figure 3 shows the normalized size of the largest cooperator cluster s1, the
susceptibility χ and the reduced Binder’s fourth-order cumulant U as a function of
f for different lattice sizes L. Figure 3(a) shows that s1 is almost the same for different
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Figure 3. The normalized size of the largest cooperator cluster s1 (a), the
susceptibility χ (b) and the reduced Binder’s fourth-order cumulant U (c) as a function
of f for different lattice sizes L. In (c), all curves intersect at fc ≃ 0.7551. The
temptation to defect 1 < b < 4/3. Each curve is an average of 20000, 10000, 5000,
2000 and 1000 realizations for L = 100, 200, 400, 800 and 1600, respectively.
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Figure 4. The normalized size of the largest cooperator cluster s1 (a) and the
susceptibility χ (b) as a function of the system size N at the critical value fc ≃ 0.7551.
The temptation to defect 1 < b < 4/3.
values of L for large f . However, when f is blow some value, s1 decreases as L increases.
Figure 3(b) shows that the susceptibility χ reaches a maximum at some value of f for
different values of L. Moreover, one can see that the value of f that corresponds to the
peak of χ increases with L. The critical value fc can then be identified in Fig. 3(c),
where the curves of the reduced forth-order cumulant U for different L intersect with
each other [69, 70]. The intersection point gives fc ≃ 0.7551 for 1 < b < 4/3.
Figure 4 shows s1 and χ as a function of N at the critical value fc. From Figs. 4(a)
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Figure 5. The normalized size of the largest cooperator cluster s1 (a), the
susceptibility χ (b) and the reduced Binder’s fourth-order cumulant U (c) as a function
of f for different values of the lattice size L. In (c), all curves intersect at fc ≃ 0.9553.
The temptation to defect 3/2 < b < 2. Each curve is an average of 20000, 10000, 5000,
2000 and 1000 realizations for L = 100, 200, 400, 800 and 1600, respectively.
and (b), we obtain the critical exponents β/ν ≃ 0.051 and γ/ν ≃ 0.908, which
are very close to the critical exponents of regular site percolation (β/ν ≃ 0.052 and
γ/ν ≃ 0.896) [67]. These results indicate that the cooperation percolation belongs to
the same universality class as the regular site percolation when 1 < b < 4/3.
3.2. The case of 3/2 < b < 2
We explore the cooperation percolation when 3/2 < b < 2. Figure 5 shows the
normalized size of the largest cooperator cluster s1, the susceptibility χ and the reduced
Binder’s fourth-order cumulant U as a function of f for different lattice sizes L. As
shown in Fig. 5(a), s1 decreases as the system size increases when f is below some
value. The susceptibility χ reaches the maximal value at some value of f [see Fig. 5(b)]
and the reduced fourth-order cumulants cross at the critical point fc ≃ 0.9553 [see
Fig. 5(c)].
Figure 6 shows s1 and χ as a function of the system size N at the critical value fc. In
Figs. 6(a) and (b), we obtain the critical exponents β/ν ≃ 0.082 and γ/ν ≃ 0.856, which
are close to the critical exponents of invasion percolation with trapping (β/ν ≃ 0.084 and
γ/ν ≃ 0.832) [71]. These results demonstrate that the cooperation percolation belongs
to the same universality class as invasion percolation with trapping in the region of
3/2 < b < 2.
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Figure 6. The normalized size of the largest cooperator cluster s1 (a) and the
susceptibility χ (b) as a function of the system size N at the critical value fc ≃ 0.9553.
The temptation to defect 3/2 < b < 2.
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Figure 7. (a) The normalized size of the largest cooperator cluster s1 and the fraction
of cooperators in the whole population Fc, as a function of the initial fraction of
cooperators f on a 1600× 1600 square lattice. (b) The normalized size of the largest
cooperator cluster s1 as a function of the system size N when initially there is only
one defector. The temptation to defect 4/3 < b < 3/2.
3.3. The cases of 4/3 < b < 3/2 and b > 2
Figure 7(a) shows the normalized size of the largest cooperator cluster s1 and the fraction
of cooperators Fc, as a function of the initial concentration of cooperators f when
4/3 < b < 3/2. One can observe that Fc is much lower than 1 and s1 ≈ 0 even when
f is very close to 1. Figure 7(b) shows s1 as a function of N when initially there is
only one defector in the system. We can find that s1 decreases as N increases. Figure 7
demonstrates that the percolation threshold for 4/3 < b < 3/2 is fc = 1. To intuitively
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(c)(b)(a)
Figure 8. Snapshots of distributions of cooperators (blue) and defectors (red)
at different time steps t on a 99 × 99 square lattice. The temptation to defect
4/3 < b < 3/2. (a) t = 0, (b) t = 20 and (c) t = 1000.
understand why the threshold is 1 in the parameter region, we explore the evolution of
the spatial distributions of cooperators and defectors on a square lattice with given a
single defector at the center initially (t = 0). Figure 8 shows that eventually a giant
reticular defector cluster is formed and many small cooperator clusters are separated
by defectors. This result is in agreement with that reported in Ref. [72], i.e., defectors
can spread over the system even initially there is only one defector in the region of
4/3 < b < 3/2. Hence only the absence of defector can lead to a large cooperator
cluster that covers the whole lattice, accounting for the phase transition at fc = 1.
In the case of b > 2, cooperators cannot survive when f < 1 (results are not shown
here), implying that even one defector can lead to the extinction of cooperators in the
ocean of cooperators when b > 2. We can thus infer that the percolation threshold for
b > 2 is also fc = 1.
4. Conclusions and Discussions
In conclusion, we have explored the formation of cooperator clusters in the prisoner’s
dilemma game, finding that the process of establishing a giant cluster pertains to the
percolation behavior. In particular, when the initial fraction of cooperators in the
system exceeds a critical threshold, there arises a giant spanning cooperator cluster,
resulting from the merging of many small cooperator clusters. The phase transition
behavior is validated by various scaling laws at the critical point, such as the normalized
size of the largest cooperator cluster and the susceptibility scale with the system size.
Strikingly, the phase transition belongs to different universality classes, depending on
the temptation of defect. The results on square lattices demonstrate that the phase
transition is subject to the class of regular site percolation when 1 < b < 4/3 or
invasion percolation with trapping when 3/2 < b < 2. Whereas in the parameter
region 4/3 < b < 3/2 and b > 2, the percolation threshold is 1, indicating that even
one defector can prevent the formation of large cooperator clusters. Interestingly, we
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found that the partition of the parameter region in terms of percolation is exactly the
same as previous findings based on the chaotic spatial patterns in literature [4, 72]. The
agreement offers an underlying connection between the phase transition and the spatial
chaos in evolutionary games.
Our findings presented here raise a number of questions, answers to which could
further deepen our understanding of the persistence and dominance of cooperation in
terms of a large cooperator cluster. For example, for strategy updating rules rather
than the currently used best-take-over rule, such as the Fermi rule [63], if the percolation
transition remains? If the answer is positive, will the universality class change? Another
significant question pertaining to the network structure is how does the structural
property affect the percolation phenomena, e.g., small-world and scale-free topology.
Taken together, our results indicate that cooperation in many evolutionary games can
be explored from the perspective of cooperator clusters in the combination with the tools
for quantifying phase transition and percolation, opening new avenues to deepening our
understanding of cooperative behaviors widely observed in many aspects in nature and
society.
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